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REVIEWS
John E. SEEry, ed. A Political Companion to Walt Whitman. Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2011. x + 373 pp.
In a 1937 article entitled “Whitman—Nationalist or Proletarian?,” Gay Wilson 
Allen argued that Whitman’s real roots were not national but international and 
proletarian: “Instead of seeking for an interpretation of Whitman in terms of 
the American frontier, Jacksonianism, or the ideology of American democracy, 
he should be studied as a configuration of a world-proletarian movement.” 
Perhaps under the influence of F. O. Matthiessen who, in his major study 
American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman, 
acknowledged the common “devotion to the possibilities of democracy” shared 
by Emerson, Whitman, Thoreau, Hawthorne, and Melville, at the same time 
that he banished politics to the margins in order to focus on the formalist and 
aesthetic qualities of “the writing itself,” the Whitman we inherited from the 
Cold War came to us curiously clipped of his political and working class roots, 
his homoeroticism, and his communal vision.  At the time I began writing 
Whitman the Political Poet in the 1980s, Whitman was regarded as a primar-
ily mystical and spiritual poet, writing under the influence of Emerson and 
Transcendentalism.  
Over the past two decades, however, political theorists and philosophers—
including George Kateb, Richard Rorty, Martha Nussbaum, and Cornel 
West—have turned with renewed interest to Whitman as a serious philosopher 
and theorist of democracy.  This “literary turn” among political theorists is 
particularly evident in the series of “political companions” to classic American 
writers published by the University Press of Kentucky over the past five years, 
including most recently A Political Companion to Walt Whitman, edited by John 
E. Seery.  The expressed goal of these editions is to illuminate the ways the 
“nation’s greatest authors” have shaped America’s democratic experiment.
Whereas in the past, Whitman’s politics would have been dismissed as irrel-
evant, hopelessly quaint, and even naïve, all of the theorists in Seery’s Political 
Companion approach Whitman as a poet actively engaged in the constitution 
of a democratic citizenry and community.  Seery organizes his Political Com-
panion into three “convenient clusters”—“Individuality and Connectedness,” 
“City Life and Bodily Place,” and “Death and Citizenship”—which aim 
finally for a Whitmanian “fluidity of interpretation.” The first cluster begins 
appropriately with George Kateb’s foundational essay “Walt Whitman and the 
Culture of Democracy,” which was originally published in Political Theory in 
1990.  Kateb’s essay pioneered in introducing Whitman as a political theorist 
in its opening sentence: “I think that Walt Whitman is a great philosopher 
of democracy. Indeed, he may be the greatest,” Kateb asserts (19).  Reading 
Whitman’s “Song of Myself” as “a work in political theory,” Kateb focuses on 
“Democratic Individuality” in the tradition of Emerson and Thoreau as the 
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central meaning of democratic culture in Whitman’s work.  “Connectedness…
emanates from democratic individuality, as Whitman perceives and perfects 
it,” Kateb argues; the poet’s concept of the individual as multiple, composite, 
and “strange” becomes the means through which individuals are connected 
to others in a democratic rights-based polity (20).  In Kateb’s view, this ideal 
of “connectedness” as a “receptivity and responsiveness” within the individual 
“is not well illustrated by Whitman’s notion of adhesive love, or love of com-
rades” (37). “The comradely side of Whitman,” he avers provocatively, “is 
not his most attractive because it is not the genuinely democratic one” (38).
Kateb’s exclusive focus on “Democratic Individuality” as Whitman’s major 
contribution as a political theorist is contested and revised not only in sub-
sequent essays within the opening cluster, but by other theorists throughout 
the volume.  Responding to Kateb in “Strange Attractors: How Individuals 
Connect to Form Democratic Unity,” an essay originally published in the 
same issue of Political Theory in 1990, Nancy L. Rosenblum challenges his 
notion that individualism and the self’s receptivity and contingency, whether 
Whitmanian or otherwise, can become the foundation for a political philoso-
phy of democratic unity.  More important to political theory, she contends, 
is the aesthetic role that Whitman’s visionary poems play in creating a sub-
lime spectacle of diversity that attaches people to democracy.  “In place of 
an account of democratic unity in which contingent selves are drawn to one 
another,” Rosenblum argues that “the adhesive power that Whitman sets at 
work in readers of his poetry and in American thought is distinctively aesthetic, 
and the object of attraction is a peculiarly poetic vision of democracy” (55). 
However, because Whitman’s spectacle of democracy is “aesthetic” and “sub-
lime,” it plays no direct role in “political belief” or particular forms of “civic” 
life such as parties and voting.  In “Mestiza Politics: Walt Whitman, Barack 
Obama, and the Question of Union,” Cristina Beltrán draws on Rosenblum’s 
claim that political theorists have given insufficient attention to the “binding 
power of aesthetics” (60).  She brilliantly reads the mass gatherings during 
Obama’s election campaign as “Whitmanesque spectacles of diversity” in 
which participants experienced their very real conflicts and difference as “a 
form of democratic enchantment” (61).  Rather than activating “strong feelings 
of attraction to democracy,” however, Obama’s political rallies, like Whitman’s 
“spectacles of democracy,” enact a politics of equivalence that privileges union 
over justice and neutralizes real problems of racial violence and hierarchy in 
America (60). “As a practice of democratic theory,” Beltrán asks, “what are 
the risks of choosing absorption over agonism?” (74). 
Although Martha Nussbaum’s essay, “Democratic Desire: Walt Whitman,” 
was originally published in Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions 
in 2001, her essay appears to respond to the questions of injustice, race violence, 
and hierarchy in Whitman’s poems raised by Beltrán.  The first in the volume 
to emphasize the role of erotic love and a new attitude toward the body and 
sexuality in Whitman’s democratic poetics, Nussbaum argues that far from 
neglecting problems of race, slavery, gender, and sexuality, Whitman’s poetic 
celebration of the “ethical” values of the body, sexuality, and love becomes 
the means of solving “the problems of hate and hierarchy.”  “Over against this 
flawed America” of racial and sexual oppression, Nussbaum affirms, “Whit-
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man sets the America of the poet’s imagination, healed of self-avoidance, fear, 
and cruelty, and therefore able truly to pursue liberty and equality” (119). Mov-
ing away from the humanist perspective of previous essays to a posthumanist 
perspective in “The Solar Judgment of Walt Whitman,” Jane Bennett offers a 
refreshing antidote to the more judgmental and moralistic approaches offered 
by Beltrán and Nussbaum.  She reads Whitman’s passage, “He judges not as 
the judge judges but as the sun falling around a helpless thing” as a critique 
of the unethical aspects of moral judgment and “judgmentalism,” which ap-
plies to life a “falsifying logic of either/or, good/evil, friend/enemy” and takes 
“a certain pleasure in exposing and punishing the sins of others” (132).  In 
Bennett’s illuminating view, “Solarity” or solar judgment in Whitman’s po-
ems enables “a special kind of perception, the capacity to discern the voices 
of (so-called) inanimate things” (132).  Suspending the identity-frame and 
conventional legal and moral categories, Whitman speaks in what she calls a 
“middle voice” that neither passively receives nor actively embraces in order 
to enact in his poems and induce in his readers a new kind of solar judgment 
that does not judge but is judgment (139).
Whereas the opening cluster effectively foregrounds the relation between 
the individual and the aggregate in Whitman’s democratic poetics and in 
democratic theory, in the second section political philosophers turn to Whit-
man’s poems of the modern city as a particular site of democratic liberation 
and enchantment.  Against an antidemocratic terror of the urban crowd, 
or what Edmund Burke called “the swinish multitude” in his attack on the 
French Revolution, Marshall Berman, in “‘Mass Merger’: Whitman and 
Baudelaire, the Modern Street, and Democratic Culture,” compares Whitman 
and Baudelaire as poets who seek to make people feel at home in the city by 
turning modern cities like New York and Paris into sites of erotic exchange 
between strangers and sites for “the liberation of sexual fantasy” (151).  In 
“Promiscuous Citizenship,” Jason Frank departs from those like Kateb who 
“overemphasize the Emersonian dimensions of Whitman’s political thought” 
(161).  Returning to the problem of “connection” and the binding power of 
aesthetics addressed by Rosenblum and Beltrán, Frank argues that it is in “the 
promiscuity of urban encounter among anonymous strangers” that Whitman 
found the experiential and aesthetic base for political attachment and a new 
vision of democratic citizenship (157).  More so than other contributors, Frank 
recognizes that the political crisis of the union to which Whitman’s Leaves of 
Grass responded was more than a crisis of citizens experiencing a solely formal 
attachment to law, party, or state.  Through his experimental poetics, Whitman 
sought to embody and enact forms of democratic citizenship and attachment 
that, as he wrote in his later prose meditation on the future of democracy, 
Democratic Vistas (1871), link people beneath the level of “legislation, police, 
treaties, and the dread of punishment.”
Reading Whitman through the lens of continental philosophy in “Walt 
Whitman and the Ethnopoetics of New York,” Michael Shapiro calls attention 
to the monologic whiteness of Whitman’s “I” and his failure to engage more 
dialogically with the ethnic difference of New York City in comparison with 
modern and contemporary “realist” writers.  Unlike Whitman who “must 
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compress or conjure away finite historical time” to achieve “a universalism 
of democratic life,” Shapiro argues, contemporary novels such as Harrison’s 
Bodies Electric (1993) provide “a realism about the micropolitics of the city 
that is passed over in the mythopoesis of Walt Whitman” (201, 210).  Like 
Shapiro and Beltrán, Terrell Carver’s essay, “Democratic Manliness,” also 
writes against both Whitman as icon and democracy as icon, because Whit-
man’s male-centered vision, like the male-dominated theory of American 
democracy, is full of racial, sexual, and class exclusions that are undemocratic. 
Rather than iconizing either Whitman or democracy, Carver proposes that 
“Whitman’s agonism”—his own poetic struggle “over what counts as demo-
cratic principles and practices”—offers the best means of pursuing current 
contestations over democracy (239).
The political theorists in the final cluster, “Death and Citizenship,” all re-
flect on the ways human mortality inflects Whitman’s vision of the theory and 
practice of democracy.  In “Whitman as a Political Thinker,” Peter Augustine 
Lawler reads Democratic Vistas through the lens of Alexis De Tocqueville’s 
aristocratic critique of democracy in Democracy in America.  Lawler’s against-
the-grain assessment concludes that Democratic Vistas is, in effect, a “Noble 
Failure” because Whitman never reconciles Hegel and Darwin with religion 
and what he called the “free entrance” of the person “into the spiritual world” 
(269).  But as Bennett and other contributors to this volume elucidate, Whit-
man was not—as is usually assumed—a poet of “personal” immortality.  In 
fact, as Jack Turner stresses in “Whitman, Death, and Democracy,” Whitman 
was at best agnostic about death, and, like a long line of classical philosophers, 
from Plato, to Epicurus, to Seneca, “this coolness in the face of death” reveals 
affinities with “the character dispositions and sensibilities most conducive to 
democracy” (272).  Through an analysis of Whitman’s “tripartite poetics of 
death,” a poetics that combines an affirmation of the material continuity of 
the self through time with an agnosticism about God, Turner enhances our 
understanding of Whitman’s radicalism as a democratic theorist by underscor-
ing the fact that his theory “not only acknowledges but also celebrates human 
finitude” (273).  Contrary to Tocqueville and Lawler, Turner perceptively 
avers, “agnosticism about death enhances democratic citizenship” (290).
In “Morbid Democracies: The Bodies Politic of Walt Whitman and Richard 
Rorty,” Kennan Ferguson also grounds his contrast between the “embodied 
democracies” of Rorty and Whitman in the different relationship each had to 
death (297).  Unlike Rorty, who envisions Whitman as the poet of “a future 
democratic condition,” Ferguson reads Whitman as a poet of the present, 
“of the United States as they are, not as they have been or will be,” for whom 
death is not to be feared but celebrated as an intrinsic aspect of life (300). 
Actually, however, the drama of the “body politic” in Whitman’s poems lies 
somewhere between Rorty’s futurist and Ferguson’s presentist perspective. 
Whitman envisioned the present as continually linked with both the past and 
the future, a metaphysics, a politics, and a poetics he embodied grammatically 
in the present participial form of the closing lines of “Song of Myself,” which 
move from the I of the poet to the you of the reader in a perpetual present that 
links past and future, poet and reader: “I stop somewhere waiting for you.”
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More than other theorists in this collection, Morton Schoolman’s “Demo-
cratic Enlightenment: Whitman and Aesthetic Education” illumines the struc-
tural relationship between “political liberty and equality” and “individualism,” 
or what he calls “identity and difference,” in Whitman’s democratic poetics and 
political theory (320).  Focusing on the contradiction between “the individual” 
and “the mass” that animates Democratic Vistas, Schoolman examines Whit-
man’s attempt “to realize the principle of all-inclusiveness” and “democratic 
enlightenment” through the aesthetic education of his poetry (315).  “Moving 
identity and difference beyond contradiction,” he writes, “Whitman achieves 
reconciliation—between North and South, the People and the people, the 
individual and the mass” (320).  For Schoolman, it is through Whitman’s 
aesthetic orientation to the world as appearance and thus intrinsically unknow-
able, and especially through his poetry of the “unknown” and “death,” that 
Whitman seeks “to create and maintain the all-inclusiveness and openness to 
difference” that make American democracy unique (324).  In Schoolman’s 
view, Whitman’s aesthetic model of democracy, in which difference can exist 
free of the violence associated with “the construction of Otherness,” makes it 
“perhaps the most radical in modern democratic theory” (327).
In addition to his enlightening and elegantly detailed reading of Democratic 
Vistas, Schoolman also illuminates the implications of Whitman’s aesthetic 
vision of democracy for modern democratic theory.  Whereas other theorists 
in the volume align themselves with either the individualist Whitman or the 
more adhesive Whitman of connectedness, Schoolman is the only theorist 
who calls attention to the conflict and potential contradiction between indi-
vidualism, or what Whitman calls personalism, and the collectivity, or what 
Whitman calls “the mass, or lump character,” as the underlying dynamic not 
only of Democratic Vistas but of his theory of democracy as it is embodied in 
the poems of Leaves of Grass.
However, in emphasizing “reconciliation,” and especially Whitman’s 
“achievement” of reconciliation in his poems, Schoolman, like others in the 
volume, gives insufficient attention to the fundamental agon—the dynamic 
tension between self and other, I and you—that shapes the drama of demo-
cratic identity in Leaves of Grass.  This tension between I and You, poet and 
reader, present and future, is evident in the long poem, later entitled “Song 
of Myself,” that opens the 1855 edition of Leaves of Grass:
  I celebrate myself,
  And what I assume you shall assume,
  For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you.
This same agon between individual and en-masse, or what the Constitutional 
founders viewed as the conflict between liberty and social union, frames the 
opening poem of the final edition of Leaves of Grass (1881):
  One’s-Self I sing, a simple separate person,
  Yet utter the word Democratic, the word En-Masse.
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Unlike Schoolman, who claims that “Whitman achieves reconciliation,” 
Whitman seeks not so much to reconcile as to balance the tensions between 
self and other, body and soul, pride and sympathy, liberty and community in 
body and body politic.  But in the poems of Leaves of Grass as in Democratic 
Vistas, this drama of democratic identity remains more agonistic and open-
ended: a democratic vista that may—or may not—be achieved in history.  Or, as 
Whitman put it in “Poets to Come”: “I myself but write one or two indicative 
words for the future, / I but advance a moment only to wheel and hurry back 
in the darkness . . . / Leaving it to you to prove and define it, / Expecting the 
main things from you.” 
At a time when the United States is still locked in a political struggle about 
whether men who love men or women who love women have the same civil 
and legal rights as all Americans, it is odd that Schoolman, like others in the 
volume, does not discuss the centrality of Whitman’s vision of manly passion 
and same-sex love as the affective foundation of both American union and 
the future of democracy in the United States and worldwide.  In fact, in the 
“Calamus” sequence, which was first published on the eve of the Civil War 
in the 1860 edition of Leaves of Grass, Whitman sought to resolve the political 
crisis of the Union on the level of the body, sex, and homoerotic love: “The 
dependence of Liberty shall be lovers, / The continuance of Equality shall be 
comrades. / These shall tie and band stronger than hoops of iron.”  
While Berman and Frank both emphasize the “sexiness” of Whitman’s city 
as a site of erotic exchange among strangers, and Frank powerfully elucidates 
the ways “the promiscuity of urban encounter among anonymous strangers” 
becomes the affective base for Whitman’s new vision of “political attachment” 
and what he evocatively calls “promiscuous citizenship,” the forms of erotic 
attachment in Whitman’s “Calamus” sequence and elsewhere in his poems 
were not limited to “anonymous” encounters between strangers in the city: 
they were also intimate, passionate, bodily, wounded, and almost uniquely 
among men (157).  As in “When I Heard at the Close of the Day,” the forms of 
erotic love between men that Whitman imagined as the base of a fully realized 
democracy were also often set, not in the city, but in relation to the rhythms 
of nature or the sea: “For the one I love most lay sleeping by me under the 
same cover in the cool night, / In the stillness in the autumn moonbeams his 
face was inclined toward me, / And his arm lay lightly around my breast—and 
that night I was happy.”
In At the Edge: The Future of Political Theory, Wendy Brown compares po-
litical theory and literature as forms of presenting the world “working to one 
side of direct referents.”  Perhaps because of this, the theoretical analyses in 
this volume often seem abstracted from the political crisis of the union—and 
the linked issues of labor, slavery, race, class, gender, capital, technology, 
territorial expansion, and war—to which Whitman’s nine editions of Leaves 
of Grass responded between 1855 and 1891-92.  But while the theorists give 
little sense of the situatedness of Whitman’s writing within a particular—and 
particularly distressed—moment in democratic history and the ways Leaves 
of Grass, Whitman’s individual poems and prose writings, and his democratic 
vision changed over time, as the first volume to bring together political theo-
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rists to reflect on Whitman as a political writer, A Political Companion to Walt 
Whitman provides a rich and compelling view of Whitman’s political insight 
and teaching, his shortcomings in relation to race, slavery, and women, and 
his enduring radicalism as a democratic visionary who shared many of the 
concerns of contemporary political theory.  As Seery rightly observes in his 
superb introduction: “it is, in fact, a great time for political theorists and 
their students to read in and around Whitman.  Many of our contemporary 
concerns seem to be echoic of Whitman’s stirrings: democracy’s discontents 
and aspirations, America’s boundaries; nationalism, transnationalism, post-
colonialism, and globalization; individualism versus aggregation; identity 
versus difference; gender, sexuality, race, and class concerns; civic religion; 
war; postmetaphysics; the pluralized subject; cultural politics.  In many ways, 
political theorists in America have already been working for quite some time 
on manifold Whitmanesque themes, and it may be time to draw explicit at-
tention to that unrhymed legacy” (4).
Northwestern University               BEtSy Erkkila
ivy G. WilSon, ed. Whitman Noir: Black America and the Good Gray Poet.  Iowa 
City: University of Iowa Press, 2014.  xx + 210 pp.
Halfway through Ivy G. Wilson’s Whitman Noir: Black America and the Good 
Gray Poet, Christopher Freeburg writes: “Whitman was a racist, and he did 
subscribe to white supremacist ideas and attitudes” (90). Freeburg’s assess-
ment here intuits, I think, the contradiction that sometimes complicates this 
necessary and often thrilling collection of essays. For many, Whitman remains 
the democratic poet of America, and so confusion easily abounds when Whit-
man’s racist politics are unearthed. This is a pertinent issue that cropped up 
last year at Northwestern University—where Wilson works—when M.A. music 
student Timothy McNair protested the vaunting of Whitman as a democrat 
by refusing to perform a musical setting of his poetry, which led to a failing 
course grade. Instead of definitively sorting out Whitman’s attitudes toward 
Afro Americans, Whitman Noir productively engages his conflicted inheritance, 
paying homage to an underappreciated and longstanding tradition of black 
authors embracing rather than rejecting Whitman’s poetry. Natasha Trethewey 
exemplifies this collection’s wide-ranging engagement with Whitman on race 
when she writes, “From where I stand, it’s easy to feel the kinds of contradic-
tions evident in Whitman’s work, those things he revealed both intentionally 
and inadvertently” (171). Indeed, Whitman’s specters of blackness, and our 
own haunting by his white supremacy, offer another valence to the noir of this 
collection’s title, all the more striking for its understatement.
Whitman Noir is divided into two parts, the first comprised of scholarly 
essays on the relation of Whitman to blackness and of subsequent black writ-
ers to Whitman by—aside from Wilson and Freeburg—Ed Folsom, Amina 
Gautier, Matt Sandler, and Jacob Wilkenfeld. The second part of the book 
reprints previously published personal and political reflections on Whitman 
